The welfare state is related with the citizenship practices, their participation and autonomy (Chevalier, 2016, 2019; Moreno & Marí-Klose, 2013; Pitti, 2022; Raffo & Reeves, 2000; Smith et al., 2005; Walther, 2006; Yılmaz, 2017; Yurttaguler, 2014) regardless of the country where they live in or their identity or the level of participation.
We want to state what not welfare state is, before explaining to impact of the welfare state in the life of young people. Welfare state is not only about the “welfare” or “income distribution”, but more about the social rights, social provisions and social regulation of the economic action. Moreover, it is not only the interplay between state and the institutions that state provides but it involves more actors such as private, public and third sector organisations(religious communities, charities, voluntary associations etc.) (Garland, 2016). We cannot claim that all of the service provision is made by the state in any of the countries in Europe, thus the welfare state reflects the interplay as well between the state, market and other structures of the societies.
The welfare state can be as well claimed as a “safety net” to help the poor, the disadvantaged or the people who are under risk of exclusion due to lack of economic means though that approach comes with the analogy of “Robin Hood” and “Piggy Bank”. Even though the welfare state is very much to do with income distribution as taking from rich and giving to do poor, it is more than that. But Welfare state is more like a “Piggy Bank”. As Van Kersbergen (2016,p.7) classifies the role of the welfare state as “a device to help people insure against social risks and to assist people in redistributing resources over the life cycle”. Therefore, how big is the piggy bank to insure the social risks and to assist people throughout their life cycles is important in the welfare structures. When we talk about the welfare states, there comes to the question of the expenditure of the countries against to the population to provide social services and social rights and guarantee these rights with these resources i.e. “their piggy banks”.
After we have explained what welfare state not, to elaborate the “piggy bank” anology and “safety net” aspect, we will explain the welfare state. The welfare state is an organized power used to modify the play of the market forces for guaranteeing individuals and families and providing assistance who needs the “safety net” i.e. the sick, elderly, the one unemployed to prevent individual and family crisis while equalizing the opportunities without distinction of class or status through the social services(Andersen, 2012). Though, the welfare state embraces the impact of the market in crisis situations with its safety net and alleviation measures, the risks continues up to a level due to differences in the classes and the structures of the welfare states.
Even so-called piggy bank or solely classifying the welfare state towards to the expenditures that they make is problematic and skirts the issues of emancipation, legitimacy, relations with the market and other actors and the differentiation of the “modicum” or “basic” meaning of the needs. Even though the expenditures that the welfare states make against to the provision of social services gives us a shallow view of the welfare state. It overlooks the benefits of the welfare state and the structural issues comes with it. Therefore, to dig deeper towards to the welfare state issue, we will use the model that Esping-Andersen (1990) provides.
Classification of the welfare states gives us a deeper understanding of the risks derived from the interplay of the welfare state actors as family, market and state actors. Moreover, the roles of each actor on the provision of social services comes with structural issues as we have defined before from the theories put in place concerning youth citizenship and transition periods by Chevalier (2016) and Walther (2006). Esping-Andersen (1990) classifies the welfare system in three different categories as liberal welfare stateslining towards to the market, corporatist welfare state lining towards to the religious institutions, charities and family, social-democratic states lining towards to the state while giving a small role on family and private institutions.
Before defining these types of the welfare regimes, the typologies behind this classification matters as decommodification, social stratification and role of family and market in social service provision. As we have claimed before that the welfare-state is more than the service provision, Esping-Andersen (1990,p.23) states as following :
“The welfare state is not just a mechanism that intervenes in, and possibly corrects, the structure of inequality; it is, in its own right, a system of stratification. It is an active force in the ordering of social relations.”
Here the correction of the inequalities and the system of stratification is plays the role of the involvement of individuals to society whether included or excluded. Therefore, the active force in the ordering of the social relations the role of welfare state on the lives of people in our case, the young people, is highly important.
Commodification refers to the degree of dependence of the individual to the market or the mechanisms and institutions of the welfare state to cover their needs(Gal, 1994). Thus, commodification depends on the market performance of the individual rather than the individual’s citizenship or the belonging. On the contrary, decommodification happens when the citizens can reach to social services as a matter of right but not a matter of performance and without the interference of their market involvement. Esping-Andersen(1990,p.23) describes the decommodifying welfare states as “citizens can freely, and without potential loss of job, income, or general welfare, opt out of work when they themselves consider it necessary.”. Therefore, considering the fact that the labour performance plays a huge role on the service delivery in the welfare states which stops people to participate in relevant activities as citizens.
For example, if the worker wants to join an association but the employer’s opinion towards to specific association is against to the association that the worker will join, the worker might lose his job security i.e. social security. Although, neither Esping-Andersen nor us claim that totally decommodified society would be possible. As Gal (1994) explains that, the totally decommodified society would be the society where the connection between the market value of individual’s labour would impact in his/her standart of living. In modern society and even in Europe, we cannot claim that it is possible, though as much as we lean towards to the decommodified society and establish a so-called standart of living to equalize opportunities without market performance, it is going to enhance the participation of people with low socio-economic backgrounds.
Second aspect when it comes to the welfare state regimes is the social stratification. The system of stratification even in the core aspect of the welfare state to eliminate it, it exists within. Means-tested social assistance, providing assistance to the poor and disadvantaged were the main aspects where the social stratification occurs. The welfare states role is to eliminate this disparities of income, the opportunities and provide justice between the individuals. Although, the social stratification comes with the very existence of the welfare state and its efforts to regulate and order the social relations between the classes(Esping-Andersen, 1990). Although, this social stratification results with the alienation and stigmatization of the recipients as it targets to solely the disadvantaged individuals.
Third aspect is the role of family and market in social service provision, to classify, he uses the relation between the three main actors as family, market and state on the service provision(Esping-Andersen, 1990). The main aspect of the role of family and market in social service provision is eligibility to receive a social assistance. The social assistance upholds the principle that the state is not responsible until the family’s capacity is exhausted and the family cannot provide for the individual or the community or the third sector as we defined it religious communities, charities and etc.(Garland, 2016). In the corporatist welfare regimes, the main provider is the family which results with the dependence to family which we can argue that it is not different than the decommodification where the labour is the main aspect, here the family becomes the main aspect as the provider.
The classification of welfare states by Esping-Andersen (1990) relies on these three principles. In corporatist welfare states such as Spain, Italy, Austria and France, relies on the provision of the family while the preservation of status and interplay between state, market and family is leaned upon to family rather than market and state intervention is only possible in case that the family or community cannot provide for its members. Even though, the defamiliarization is occurring in these countries, it is still permanent due to the structures(Andersen, 2012). Even though, the family aspect still preeminent for the young people as they are considered as children and dependent in the eyes of the state rather than individuals.
In liberal welfare states such as Canada, US or UK; the market has the main provider and the state only but only intervenes when the individual cannot provide for themselves. Due to that, the stigmatization of the social assistance receiver is highly permanent. In addition to that, the social security depends highly on the market performance of the individual and the individual at any circumstance cannot opt out from the market(Esping-Andersen, 1990). Thus, the liberal welfare states relies on the commodification of the individual. On the other hand, in this welfare regimes, the social stratification is eminent due to the provision of social assistance and security by the market.
In social-demoractic welfare regimes, main and sole service provider is the state even though the family and market plays a role on the service provision, the state presence is higher. Thus, the decommodification of the social assistance and principle of universalism are extended throughout the different social stratas in the society. In these sort of regimes, there is no trialism[1] ( market, state and family ) but the social benefits distributed equally without class stratifications or the market performance by mainstreaming the standart of living not the bare minimum(Esping-Andersen, 1990). Therefore, the individual can make his/her own decisions autonomously without the predictions of the market or the family. When it comes to the young people, that plays a huge importance.
Moreover, as we deal with the dilemma of the Southern Europe Welfare Regimes, we will make a detailed description about the Southern Europe Welfare Regimes. Esping-Andersen made this classification more than 3 decades ago, we argue that it still exists though, it exists with different experiences. Due to globalization, the arrangements, from single-bread winner to dual bread winner i.e. changed gender roles, we would like to emphasize the fourth classification as “Southern Europe Welfare state regimes” due to different variations of the service provision and the bigger role of the family in the service provision comparing to the corporatist regimes and the selective and competitive nature of the education and employment scene(Andersen, 2012, 2012; Chevalier, 2016, 2019; Garland, 2016; Karamessini, 2007; Moreno & Marí-Klose, 2013; Rhodes, 1996; Walther, 2006).
We claim that the corporatist welfare state as Esping-Andersen is not enough the classification of the Southern European Welfare system. The main difference between the corporatist regimes as Esping-Andersen defines it, is the family plays a significant role on the life of the individual due to different practices such as elderly care, co-habiting with parents after marriage or depending on the parents to make investments in later ages due to strong ties with the family as a social norm(Moreno & Marí-Klose, 2013). Ferrera (2005,p.3) underlines of the differences of the Southern Europe concerning to the welfare states by stating “Southern Europe” has not only a geographical, but also a substantive, cultural and politico-economic connotation”. Even though, the social assistantance to fight poverty and provide economic means for the poor existed in the Southern Europe, these cash transfers were not enough to alleviate the poverty due to as Ferrara describes it “holes in the overall fabric of public provision”. Thus, the gap for the people who are under poverty to have decent means to live is filled with the micro solidarity between the extended family of the individual as the safety net in Southern Europe rather than the state or market comparing to the other countries.
Moreover, the caregiver role due to familialization of the welfare state become a burden on the shoulder of the women to care the children, elderly or the persons with special needs. As a result, women had to leave their careers to provide care or total withdrawal from the employment(Ferrera, 2005a). In our case, that results with the drop-outs or the not involvement in the education in further stages of the youth transition. As MacDonald (2011) mentioned before that concerning to the youth transition regimes, the young people who have to take care of their family members as they cannot involve neither in the education nor employment. Often, these young people in that sense young care givers are NEETs not only they do not fit into the standardized youth transition regime,but they do not have safety net to unburden the role of caregiving due to childcare, elderly care or disabled care services. That’s one of the results of the Southern-Welfare regimes.
Another aspect as Moreno & Marí-Klose (2013) explains that the young people relies on their parents for financial support from buying a home, entering to a business or involving in education or in some cases internships[2]. Moreover, the family has a role on filling the wide holes of the social welfare system in the life of young people. Due to so-called microsolidarity, the elderly expects the same care when they came to an old age from the young people in the working age, this intergenerational bond is deeply rooted in Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Turkey. Thus, the welfare state regime eligibility factor not depends on the income of the individual once again, but the household i.e. family.
Another similarity in the Southern Welfare states is informal economy. In Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Turkey, the informal economy shares the significant part of the economy (Ferrera, 2005a). The size of the informal economy in the Southern European countries is indicated in the latest statistical data by World Economics (2022) as follows : Turkey(31,2%), Greece (26,9%), Italy(23,7%), Spain(21,3%), Portugal(20.3%) while same data indicates Germany as 11,2% or France as 13.1%. The difference indicates that we cannot classify the Southern Europe States with the corporatist states as Esping-Andersen defined it.
The impact of the irregular economy to the welfare state is significant. As the irregular economy provides a substantial number of jobs in tourism, agriculture, infrastructure and etc.(Ferrera, 2005a) though, it constitutes the unskilled work rather than the work for the educated. Moreover, it does not provide a substantial amount of the social security and these jobs are often precarious without a contract or with a fixed-time contracts. Thus, it does not include the individuals in the welfare system but excludes them and puts them in situation that they cannot benefit from the welfare system as these jobs does not provide a tie to welfare system. Therefore, the individuals are not provided social security neither by the market nor by the state but the role of the welfare state is left on the shoulder of the families. Therefore, it can be argued that the commodification is made by the market, though the return of this commodification still not yet received as in liberal welfare state regimes,yet the individuals turn to their families to receive the benefits.
Another issue of the Southern Welfare regimes is the issue of the eligibility for the social assistance. As the people who are in informal economy without contracts, they are not eligible to unemployment benefits, yet they are eligible to the social assistance. To evaluate this eligibility is made by the means-test which is in the shoulder of the state though due to lack of capacity which results with the poor performance of the authorities(Ferrera, 2005a). Therefore, the safety nets cannot be consolidated and established due to lack of establishment in the Southern Europe states.
The welfare state is highly relevant with the civic and political participation of the individuals to the society(Chevalier, 2019; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hammer, 2004; Marshall, 1950; Raffo & Reeves, 2000; Walther, 2006; Ferrera, 2005a). Concerning to political participation, it can be evaluated in two different aspects, as conventional and unconventional. Conventional aspect of political participation is considered as voting in elections, involving in political parties or trade unions and likewise activities while unconventional type of political participation considered as participating in petitions, boycotts, demonstrations and etc. (Hammer, 2004). When it comes to the young people, it is seen that the unconventional ways of participation is more common than the conventional ways of participation.
The reason behind and its relation with the welfare system is indicated by several scholars differently. According to Hammer (2004), political participation has relation with the welfare state structures as she found out that, among the social assistance recipients, the participation in unconventional political activities is higher than the non-recipients. Moreover, Chevalier (2019) indicates that the denied youth citizenship comes with a low level political trust comparing to the enabling youth citizenship. Moreover as we have explained before seeing the young people as citizens of tomorrow rather than the citizens of today, comes with the baggage of making the young people as “passive” citizens results with the disengagement of young people from the political community.
We will focus on the interconnectedness of the social rights of young people while considering them as “full” and active citizens can practice their political rights from Marshallian perspective. As citizenship is related to the political rights of young people, even though the welfare policies consider young people as “clients” rather than citizens. They receive the benefits though they do not participate or involve in the common responsibilities and duties of a citizen (Hammer, 2004). Even though, young people present specific political attitudes and behaviours when it comes to the conventional ways of participation.
The youth discourse as we have explained perceives the impact as well as the standpoint of the welfare state towards to the citizenship of young people. The consideration of young people as resource promotes the individualisation of young people as well as their direct access to public services provided by the state. Therefore, it promotes their autonomy and participation in the political life as they are not tied to market as in liberal market states or the family as in Southern European welfare states. It is as well argued that if the young people is provided access to social rights directly rather than a dependent child, the political trust of young people increases(Chevalier, 2019). Therefore, it can be argued that the decommodification of young people and considering of young people as “resource” rather than “dependent” can have an impact on the political participation of young people.
Another aspect in front of the participation and welfare state policies is the employment and unemployment. Bassoli & Monticelli (2018) discussed this issue concerning to issue by reference to different models as “resource model” and “grievance model”. The young people who are involved in precarious job activities resent towards to the youth who are already in the labour market by engaging in unconventional participation mechanisms such as protesting, boycotting, demonstrations and blockades as they do not trust to political system and they are against to civic engagement such as involving representative democratic systems, voting or volunteering. In addition to that, the young people such as in Spain and Italy, the young people tend to have low career prospects as they are less protected from the unemployment by the welfare state comparing to the employed ones. It results with the lack of interest and lack of trust to the institutions viz lack of political participation of young people.
Even though, youth participation is impacted from the employment and unemployment, it is neither merely the political participation but as well the inclusion of young people to the civic participation mechanisms such as youth councils(Walther, 2006), without involving the young people directly into the decision mechanisms but introducing the decision-mechanisms to young people and preparing them. In addition to that, it often extended to the participation of young people to the education and social work, where the principle of working with young people is present but more often the aim to increase their participation to the social and civic life rather than a political one. In that sense, it is understood that the youth participation is related with their feeling towards to a being a part of respective society and their claims from the institutions through their practices in public places. Therefore, we argue that the mobility of young people as well as involvement of them and their claims in the social space is highly related with their participation.
Moreover, even though political, social or civic participation is defined differently by various scholars, the common idea is that the young people involves and engages in politics, claims their activities throughout sets of activities even conventional or unconventional(Bee, 2021; Chevalier, 2019; Walther, 2006). In that sense, we emphasize the aspect of political participation is not only the voting but the involvement of young people towards to the issues that they define important such as participating protests, signing petitions or involving in a digital campaign throughout the social media. Therefore, the young people’s participation towards to such issues shows that they claim their spaces and they act towards to the issues that they define as important as equal citizens rather than citizens in making.
On the other hand, the civic participation or civic engagement plays an another role on the participation of young people towards to the issues that they define important such as their voluntary activities to provide mutual help to each other or developing solutions towards to issues in their own communities. It leads one way or another to the activation of the participation of the young people.As the many activities concerning to involvement of voluntary organisations promote the mutual help and foster the social solidarity among young people(Bee, 2021). Therefore, it can be argued that the civic engagement either it is involving to the voluntary activities or helping to an elderly as an act of solidarity promotes the political participation and sense of belonging among the young people.
On the flip side of the same coin, the young people’s participation has a relation with their poverty without a reference to a specific welfare state structure. When the young people involves in the extracurricular organisations providing knowledge and skills during their school to work transition, they are tend to involve more due to increased skills not through the usual school-work transition period but due to their involvement in informal learning mechanisms. In a broader sense, the poverty that we refer here is not only the monetary resources, but moreover avoiding the shame(Damelang & Kloß, 2013).
As the young people in Southern Europe Welfare states, they are dependent on their family rather than the state or the market which requires performance and results with decommodification, the young people tend to become ashamed of their poverty of their parents and internalise their situation. In that sense, the social withdrawal because of shame and lack of resources occur which results with the accumulation of the disadvantages for children and young people affected from the poverty. That results with their withdrawal from the politics, civic life even the employment but leaning towards to their families.
As we have defined the political, civic i.e. social participation, even though the common efforts of the European states and candidate countries like in Turkey in our case, the participation of young people is underestimated only about their participation to the voting regards to the political participation. Even though the discourses between the term as participation changes, the ways of participation is classified by Walther et al. (2002,p.6.) as following :
- Political participation is especially thematised with regard to dropping election rates
- Participation in education and training refers to being enrolled in respective institutions whether organised in a participatory way or not, whether being active learners or not.
- Education for participation and citizenship in school and youth work refers to young people’s ascribed lack of skills and competencies to participate (in a recognized way) – later.
- Social and civic participation refers to engagement in associations, voluntary work, youth work activities and youth councils.
Therefore, these participation measures are referred in the youth policy papers in a clearer aspect, though, we cannot often find any reference towards to the unconventional ways of participation or the aspirations of young people towards to the unconventional ways of participation or out-of-school i.e. informal/non-formal education measures.
In Southern Europe, the young people have distrust towards to the political institutions(Chevalier, 2019; Soler-i-Martí & Ferrer-Fons, 2015; Walther et al., 2002), thus it can be said that their political participation in conventional ways is low. But on the contrary, the dominant mechanism of participation is not institutionalised and unconventional. The reason behind it can be described as the young people are in precarious situation due to lack of safety net or their dependence and the lack of autonomy as individuals. In regards to the participation, Bourdesian approach towards to the social space gives us more clearer aspect for analysis. Social space refers to the idea that the space determinated by the distribution of the monetary and non-monetary resources in other words economic, cultural, social and symbolic capital(Soler-i-Martí & Ferrer-Fons, 2015).
It can be argued that the young people’s only way out in the social stratification is the development of their cultural and social capital. Due to poverty per se economic capital and lack of status per se symbolic capital, the young people’s participation to economic and social life highly depends on their capabilities as well as the mechanisms that enables their social and cultural capital throughout out of school opportunities, the networking between their friends and their claims in the social space.
As we are passing through the turbulent times, the destandardization, exposure the risks and uncertainty among the young people’s pathways to adulthood is changing even more fluid. The consequences of these transition models that we define might impact the formation of the social policies and how they participate to the social and political life (Soler-i-Martí & Ferrer-Fons, 2015). Considering the resilience and autonomy of the young people towards to the decision making processes not only political but even solely about their own lives is important. Therefore, the transition periods and policies shaping these period should address the development and resiliency of the young people.
In regard to transition regimes of young people, the meaningful participation of young people is required for the young people to influence and construct their lives. According to the transition regimes that Walther (2006) defined, the challenges comes with these structures. In example, the universalistic youth transition regimes, the challenge is the achievement of the meaningful participation and construction of their ideas while, the market oriented regimes provides a limited space for the young people to influence their own lives. On the contrary, in liberal youth regimes this turns into standardization effort of the transition of the young person life trajectory through taking the participation context from non-formal to formal contexts. Lastly, the sub-protective regimes have the biggest challenges and their main challenge is to provide a space for the young person to become undependent and without the supervision of their families.
As we have established the fact that the dependency to family and informal economy, the holes and selective natures of the welfare regimes are the main reasons of the withdrawal of the young people from not only the political scene but as well as the employment and education, we argue that the autonomy of the young people might address this challenges in a comprehensive manner that the young people can involve in the life without involving in precarious situations. The idea behind this is that as Bauman emphasizes that participation requires mere than existential survival and it can be only guaranteed with an unconditional basic income regardless of status, class or whatsoever(Bauman, 2001). Even we have a long way to go unconditional basic income for the young people in Southern Welfare States, for the autonomy of the individuals should be guaranteed regards to their access to social services with less eligibility structures with only considering the situation of the individual, not his/her market value or dependency to the family, or the household income.
As we have explained before the decommodification process of the welfare states is one of the biggest issues in Southern Welfare States. While the role of the welfare state is to eliminate these risks, the structures of the welfare systems as Esping-Andersen classified might contribute to the existience of these risks. Moreover, these risks can be differentiated due to class, gender, race, age or ethnicity etc.(Tahmaz, 2020). Therefore, the class risks occur in the community where the strata of society is exists and the unskilled workers are more exposed to the risk of losing the job and contiously stay in precarious situations than the skilled workers.
Even though, the unemployment schemes exists in each defined welfare state regime that we mentioned before, the eligibility factors of these schemes are the restrictive factor on the distribution. In addition to that, the reach of the unskilled workers to reach out these unemployment schemes is limited. In example, in Turkey, to be eligible from the unemployment benefits, the individual should have worked 3 year period at least 600 working days and should work continuously in his/her last work placement without interruption for 120 days(İŞKUR, 2022). These eligibility rules excludes the most of the young people as they involve in the informal economy or in seasonal works without contracts, the young people cannot reach out these unemployment benefits even if they want to.
We argue that the familialization of the welfare state results with the tremendous amount of “inter-generational risks”, comparing to the liberalist, corporatist or social-democratic welfare states. The inter-generational risks is the result of the class risks such as heritage. The inherited disadvantage or the position of power within the family continues through the family bonds(Esping-Andersen, 1990) as the family is the main provider in the southern welfare states, young people inherit these risks along the family lines. Due to familization of the the welfare state in Southern Europe, these risks are not controllable and the rights of young people is in precarious situation as their whole safety net is either in the hands of market or their own families.
T.H. Marshall defined the indivisibility of the three sets of rights as social, political and civil rights(Marshall, 1950) and if one of these rights are violated, the individual will face with challenges to practice the other sets of rights. Yurttaguler (2014,p.4) gives a clear account concerning to the situation of the young people by citing the well-known buzzword : “Equality before and under the law.”. Though, as she explains in detailed, that’s not the case for the young people not even for the people living in the Southern European countries due to the risks that we have explained above.
Right to advocate is guaranteed in all over Europe, the quality of the quality of the advocacy is not similar. If your access to a lawyer, who is an expert in your case is limited than right to a fair trial will be at risk(Yurttaguler, 2014). It is a very straight forward example about the inequalities of the welfare system as Marshall defined it, when it comes to the social rights or political participation of young people is not that visible or easy to grasp. When it comes to the family as the welfare service provider within the structure of the Southern Welfare Regimes, the inequalities become more visible and the class risks continuing along with the family lines is persistent.
The inheritance of these risks and the welfare state mechanisms are affecting the citizenship practices of young people. We argue that it is the youth policies should evolve in a way to increase the capacities of young people and increase their autonomy. Autonomy is defined as the one’s ability to make decisions about one’s life without the influence of the other people. It can vary from which party to choose, the type of education to get, or even whom the person want to marry. When the social service provision is in the hands of the welfare state, the young people are more enabled and more autonomous as they do not have a restraining factor during their job-seeking process, involvement in the education or participating in conventional ( involving political parties, etc. ) or unconventional ways (protesting, boycotting etc. ). Though, as we have explained and argued before, when the young person depends on the family or the market, young people tend to become less autonomous and independent.
From this standpoint, it can be argued that the autonomy of the young people is crucial for their participation to the employment, education, social and political scenes. Though, when it comes to the decision making about their lives in Southern Welfare states, the young people become dependent to their parents where their civil and political rights are endangered or limited due to limited-enjoyment of the rights that are provided to them. On the other hand, when it comes to the situation of the NEETs(ni-nis), the young people become disenfranchised and suffer from poverty and social exclusion that results with loss of demographic window in a macro-economic level.
The differentiation of the NEET statuses is not often considered by the policy makers and they are only considered not in education or employment or training or there are discrete categories of NEET experience such as caring, traveling, sick, self-learning or even taking a gap year. The most distinctive group among all NEET is the ones who are inactive or they are simply caregivers within their family(Jongbloed & Giret, 2022). Jongbloed and Giret (2022) extend the as NLFET (“neither in the labour force, nor in education or training”) who would not even actively searching a job even in the economic periods of growth. Thus, comprehensive NEET policies are needed to include the NEETs into the society not only considering them as not in education, employment or in training but specifically magnifying their resources.
To linkage the situation of the NEETs with the welfare structures, is that the young people who are not autonomous due to different situations such as caring for the elderly, caring for the disabled or caring for the child due to family situation is not looked or comprehensively taken into account in none of the countries that we work in which we have explained under policies. That needs a significant effort from the state side to provide better and comprehensive elderly, disability care or child care policies. These would provide situation of NEETs in the countries in a significant manner and impact the life of young people who are doing unpaid care work due to familialized structure of the welfare system.
Soler et al. (2014) considers the young people in Spain as acrobats walking in a thin rope with a safety net under the rope by referring to the transition period of the young people. The safety net is often moves from state, NGOs or the family in the case of Spain during the times of crises to save young people’ lives from the falls. They claim that the youth policies focuses on influencing young people’s lives through information, associations and activities focusing on their out-of-school participation without coordinating the key areas of shaping the lives of young people such as employment, education, housing, health and etc. Even the example of Soler et al. (2014) was only focused on Spain, it is not relatively different in the countries that we work with concerning to the welfare state regimes and their relation with the youth policies.
“Addressing the current complexity from a position near the Bermuda Triangle – where young people become the object, or invisible, or disappear symbolically and physically from the centre of the stage; where youth policies disappear or are subordinated to security policies; where research is reduced or feeds on media stereotypes and youth work survives on the basis of volunteering and austerity – is, without doubt, similar to performing the triple somersault on the trapeze without a net, a feat that requires not only skill, but also luck.” (Soler et al., 2014,p.75)
The explanation above shows that in Southern Europe, the young people not only requires a skill-set to survive from the challenges that comes with the welfare structures in our countries but more than that a luck. Thus, we have developed the following strategy paper for NGOs as well as public organizations operating in the Southern Europe to address these challenges.
References
Andersen, J. G. (2012). Welfare States and Welfare State Theory. Centre for Comparative Welfare Studies, Institut for Økonomi, Politik og Forvaltning, Aalborg Universitet.
Bassoli, M., & Monticelli, L. (2018). What about the welfare state? Exploring precarious youth political participation in the age of grievances. Acta Politica, 53(2), 204–230. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41269-017-0047-z
Bauman, Z. (2001). The individualized society. Polity Press.
Bee, C. (2021). The civic and political participation of young people in a context of heightened authoritarianism. The case of Turkey. Journal of Youth Studies, 24(1), 40–61. https://doi.org/10.1080/13676261.2019.1683523
Chevalier, T. (2016). Varieties of youth welfare citizenship: Towards a two-dimension typology. Journal of European Social Policy, 26(1), 3–19. https://doi.org/10.1177/0958928715621710
Chevalier, T. (2019). Political trust, young people and institutions in Europe. A multilevel analysis. International Journal of Social Welfare, 28(4), 418–430. https://doi.org/10.1111/ijsw.12380
Damelang, A., & Kloß, G. (2013). Poverty and the social participation of young people—An analysis of poverty-related withdrawal mechanisms. Journal for Labour Market Research, 46(4), 321–333. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12651-013-0148-8
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Princeton University Press.
Ferrera, M. (2005a). Welfare state reform in Southern Europe: Fighting poverty and social exclusion in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. Routledge.
Ferrera, M. (2005b). Welfare states and social safety nets in Southern Europe: An introduction. In M. Ferrera (Ed.), Welfare state reform in Southern Europe: Fighting poverty and social exclusion in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. Routledge.
Gal, J. (1994). Commodification, the Welfare State and Israeli Kibbutz. Journal of Sociology, 21(3).
Garland, D. (2016). The welfare state: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press.
Hammer, T. (2004). Youth unemployment, welfare and political participation: A comparative study of six countries. In J. Goul Andersen & P. Herholdt Jensen (Eds.), Changing labour markets, welfare policies and citizenship. Policy Press.
İŞKUR. (2022). İşssizlik Sigortası [Unemployment Insurance]. İşkur. https://www.iskur.gov.tr/sikca-sorulan-sorular/issizlik-sigortasi/
Jongbloed, J., & Giret, J.-F. (2022). Quality of life of NEET youth in comparative perspective: Subjective well-being during the transition to adulthood. Journal of Youth Studies, 25(3), 321–343. https://doi.org/10.1080/13676261.2020.1869196
Karamessini, M. (2007). The Southern European Social Model: Changes and Continuities in Recent Decades. The International Institute for Labour Studies (ILO).
MacDonald, R. (2011). Youth transitions, unemployment and underemployment: Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose? Journal of Sociology, 47(4), 427–444. https://doi.org/10.1177/1440783311420794
Marshall, T. H. (1950). Citizenship and Social Class: And Other Essays. Cambridge Eng.: University Press, 1950. Print.
Moreno, L., & Marí-Klose, P. (2013). Youth, family change and welfare arrangements: Is the South still so different? European Societies, 15(4), 493–513. https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2013.836400
Pitti, I. (2022). Understanding, Problematizing and Rethinking Youth Transitions to Adulthood. Navigating Transititons – Adapting Policy to Young People’s Changing Realities. Navigating Transitions, Tirana. https://pjp-eu.coe.int/documents/42128013/116339195/Symp_Analytical+Paper+-Transitions+to+Adulthood.pdf/df42d656-d110-4c44-fe5f-c7e0c1336d4e
Raffo, C., & Reeves, M. (2000). Youth Transitions and Social Exclusion: Developments in Social Capital Theory. Journal of Youth Studies, 3(2), 147–166. https://doi.org/10.1080/713684372
Rhodes, M. (1996). Southern European Welfare States: Identity, Problems and Prospects for Reform. South European Society and Politics, 1(3), 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/13608749608539480
Smith, N., Lister, R., Middleton, S., & Cox, L. (2005). Young People as Real Citizens: Towards an Inclusionary Understanding of Citizenship. Journal of Youth Studies, 8(4), 425–443. https://doi.org/10.1080/13676260500431743
Soler, P., Planas, A., & Feixa, C. (2014). Young people and youth policies in Spain in times of austerity: Between juggling and the trapeze. International Journal of Adolescence and Youth, 19(sup1), 62–78. https://doi.org/10.1080/02673843.2013.823552
Soler-i-Martí, R., & Ferrer-Fons, M. (2015). Youth Participation in Context: The Impact of Youth Transition Regimes on Political Action Strategies in Europe. The Sociological Review, 63(2_suppl), 92–117. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-954X.12264
Tahmaz, O. (2020). Human Rights of Youth in November 2019 Spanish General Election. Universidad de Cordoba.
Van Kersbergen, K. (2016). The Welfare State in Europe. In The Search for Europe: Contrasting Approaches. BBVA OpenMind. https://www.bbvaopenmind.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/BBVA-OpenMind-book-the-search-for-europe-contrasting-approaches-1.pdf
Walther, A. (2006). Regimes of youth transitions: Choice, flexibility and security in young people’s experiences across different European contexts. YOUNG, 14(2), 119–139. https://doi.org/10.1177/1103308806062737
Walther, A., Hejl, G. M., & Jensen, T. B. (2002). Youth Transitions, Youth Policy and Participation: State of the Art Report [Working Paper 1 – Research Project YOYO – Youth Policy and Participation].
WE. (2022, May). Informal / Shadow Economy Size | By Country | 2022 | Data | World Economics. World Economics. https://www.worldeconomics.com/Informal-Economy/
Yılmaz, V. (2017). Youth welfare policy in Turkey in comparative perspective: A case of ‘Denied Youth Citizenship.’ Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 17(1), 41–55. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2016.1232894
Yurttaguler, L. (2014). Do Young People Have Autonomy? In L. Yurttaguler, Y. Kurtaran, B. Oy, & L. Yurttagüler (Eds.), Youth Policies in Turkey (1st ed.). Istanbul Bilgi University Press.
[1] Esping-Andersen refers to that term as dualism, though we argue that, there is a trialism exists as there are three actors market, state and family due to individualism in the social-democratic welfare regimes.
[2] We would like to mention here that, the internships in Spain,Turkey,Italy,Portugal and Greece are not obligatory paid by the employer. That is one of the reasons, we put this emphasis even though it was not mentioned in the article of Moreno & Marí-Klose (2013).
